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Abstract
Peacekeeping in Africa: Reflections on developments and trends
Africa is arguably the most important regional selling for United Nations peace­
keeping challenges. Hence, Africa is the first continent where extensive efforts 
have recently been made between the United Nations and the Organisation of 
African Unity with the specific aim o f enhancing the management o f conflicts in 
the region. It is significant that the UN now seems prepared to form partnerships 
with willing regional organisations and alliances in Africa with regard to the 
conducting o f peace-support operations. At the same time, the United States and 
certain European nations have begun to support the idea o f an African response 
capability o f some kind. Another significant development relates to the fact that 
sub-regional organisations in Africa have started to feature as important peace­
keeping instruments in recent years as it has increasingly been accepted that there 
is a need for such institutions to take care o f their own security requirements. In 
this regard, the “indigenous " intervention operations without UN endorsement or 
involvement in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic o f the Congo and in 
Lesotho are o f particular interest, as these would seem to represent a new 
dimension in the management o f African peacekeeping requirements. What is 
needed in the African context is to establish an acceptable basis for involvement or 
intervention in intra-state conflicts that respects the dignity and independence of 
stales without sanctioning the misuse o f sovereign rights to violate the security o f 
people within a stale's borders. It would therefore be desirable that all the role- 
players in Africa and further afield should develop a set o f broad principles to 
respond appropriately and speedily to situations where the security o f people is 
imperilled.
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1. Introduction
Africa is a continent that is steeped in conflict and instability, the sources of 
which are both diverse and endemic. Despair, destitution, poverty, disease, 
refugee problems and internally displaced people have been among the 
consequences of such conflicts. In short, there is a pressing need for Africa and 
role-players in the international community to address and resolve the conflicts 
on the continent and to lay the foundation for durable peace and economic 
growth. Without stability there will be little chance for economic development 
and growth and the marginalisation of Africa in the international community 
will continue.
It is a truism that the undertaking of peace initiatives in Africa is by no means a 
simple and easy task. Conflict in Africa poses a major challenge to United 
Nations (UN) efforts designed to ensure global peace, prosperity and human 
rights for all. In fact, the African continent has had a critical impact on defining 
the limits and possibilities of the post-Cold War order and the place of the UN 
(which has the ultimate responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the 
world) in this framework. The problems and challenges that the UN has faced in 
this part of the world have reflected the peculiar difficulties of peacekeeping 
itself as African conflicts have been among the organisation’s most important 
initiatives in peacekeeping and conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War. 
In the same sense, recent developments in Africa in the form of frequent 
conflicts, the tendency of these problems to generate security problems and 
humanitarian disasters underscore the necessity for leaders on the African 
continent and other role-players to consider and reconsider response capabilities 
or regional peacekeeping capabilities o f some kind. However, African countries 
lack the resources and often the political mechanisms to address the conflicts 
and crises on the continent.
In the light o f the above, one of the most important innovations in the 
management of international security is the concept o f shared responsibility 
between the UN and African stakeholders for the effective management of 
conflicts in the region. Vogt (1998:1) points out that Africa is the first region 
where extensive efforts have been made between the UN and the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) specifically to enhance the management of conflicts in 
the region.
In the following analysis, an overview is given of the management and 
conducting of multinational peace-support operations. The international peace­
keeping system as well as the general framework for security co-operation and 
related developments in Africa are especially assessed. By the same token, an 
attempt is made to reflect upon the trends and direction of peacekeeping efforts 
in the African context with special reference to recent developments.
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2. Conducting multinational peace-support operations
Success in any peace-support operation depends upon a broad political process. 
Such missions never comprise military exercises only. In fact, military 
operations play a distinctly supportive role, and may even produce few obvious 
results as regards the outcome. Hence, peace-support operations are critically 
dependent on the extent to which international authority underpins such 
operations and on the political will o f participating member states. This kind of 
authority is necessary to assist in reducing political pressure on the countries 
responsible, to avoid international isolation of the participating countries if the 
operation “goes wrong” and to prevent overextending the capabilities of any 
country’s armed forces (Williams, 1995:91-92). Of significant importance is the 
role of the UN as regards the broad political apparatus or institutional 
framework created to manage co-operative security and to co-ordinate peace 
missions.
The 15 member states of the Security Council -  not the Secretary-General -  
create and define peace-support operations. The UN Charter specifies that the 
Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security (United Nations, 1998b). The first of the objectives of the UN listed 
in its Charter is
[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to this end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and 
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to 
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace (United Nations, 1945).
Concrete measures that are to be taken by the UN Security Council are set out in 
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Chapter VI provides that international 
disputes “likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security” can be brought to the attention of the Security Council or the General 
Assembly. If the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace or act of aggression exists, the Council may use the broad powers 
given to it in Chapter VII of the Charter. Should the Security Council regard it 
necessary, it may take, under Article 42, “action by air, sea and land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” 
(United Nations, 1945).
As already mentioned, the end of the Cold War has not reduced threats to peace 
and has in fact seen the transformation (or mutation) of classical peacekeeping 
operations into multidimensional conflict management activities. Accordingly, 
the UN requested Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then its Secretary-General, to prepare 
a report containing “ ... an analysis and recommendations on ways of 
strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of
Koers 64(4) 1999:465-487 467
Peacekeeping in Africa: Reflections on developments and trends
the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for 
peacemaking and for peacekeeping” . As a result, his report, An Agenda fo r  
Peace was submitted in 1992 and has since served as a broad framework for 
peace-support operations (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:1).
Because the UN is the source of authority for types of peace-support operations, 
its set of terms and definitions is of importance. An Agenda fo r  Peace has sought 
to identify a new approach to UN peacekeeping. It suggested that it was no 
longer appropriate to consider peacekeeping in isolation, and presented the 
concepts o f preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict 
peacebuilding as a range of options to be considered in the context of peace- 
support activities. None of these concepts were really new, but in this case they 
were presented together for the first time. In his report, the terms ‘preventive 
diplomacy’, ‘peacemaking’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘post conflict peacebuilding’ 
were defined as follows:
• Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between 
parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit 
the spread of the latter when they occur.
• Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially 
through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter 
of the UN.
• Peacekeeping is the development of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with 
the consent o f all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or 
police personnel and frequently civilians as well. It is a technique that 
expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of 
peace.
• Post-conflict peacebuilding is action to identify and support structures, which 
will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:11).
It is noteworthy that ‘peacemaking’ refers to the use of diplomatic means to 
persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement of their dispute. As with ‘preventive diplomacy’, or ‘preventive 
action’, as it is currently referred to by the Secretary-General o f the UN, the UN 
can play a meaningful role only if the parties to the dispute agree that it should 
do so. Peacemaking thus excludes the use of force against one of the parties to 
enforce an end to hostilities, an activity that in UN parlance is referred to as 
‘peace enforcement’ (United Nations, 1998a: 1). Over and above, the notion 
‘peace-support operations’ is now widely used in doctrine, for example, in 
documents of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), to cover all 
‘peacekeeping’, ‘peace enforcement’ and related operations.
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Another significant development o f  the 1990s relates to the fact that co­
operation between the U N  and regional organisations has greatly increased in 
the 1990s. Yet, the concept o f  co-operation is not entirely new. The U N  Charter 
provides for the involvement o f  “regional arrangements or agencies” for 
maintaining international peace and security along with the U N  since 1945. 
Article 53 o f  the U N  Charter even refers to enforcement action by regional 
bodies under UN authority (United Nations, 1945:11).
It is com m only known that the UN is over-extended in terms o f  resources and 
capacity to perform effectively the many peace-support tasks it has assumed 
over the last decade. Having reached a critical point, this has called for an 
appropriate division o f  responsibilities between the U N  and other role-players in 
the sphere o f  peace-support operations. In Africa, prospects to manage conflict 
by means o f  peace-support operations are closely  linked to the dynamics o f  
regional and sub-regional peace initiatives.
3. Regional peace initiatives
Conflict resolution and the issues o f  peace, security and stability have been 
major concerns o f  the O AU since its inception in 1963, when it was confronted 
with three categories o f  peace and security:
•  disputes involving only its members;
•  situations involving members with colonial regimes; and
•  situations resulting from relations between members and states outside 
Africa.
The first category involves territorial and other disputes between member states. 
Internal disputes have been outside the sphere o f  the O A U  or the UN  until as 
recently as 1993, except when there were international implications. To this end, 
the O AU has been involved in finding solutions to the conflicts in Chad and 
Nigeria. Both the O AU and the UN have been involved in the second category, 
for exam ple in Namibia. In such cases there has been great reliance on the UN. 
The third category relates to experiences where there were large-scale outside 
interference, such as in the Congo in 1960-64 and Nigeria in 1967-70.
Over and above, ad hoc arrangements were in effect the order o f  the day in 
O AU dealings with inter-state conflicts, while intra-state conflicts were largely 
left to each member state to handle (Nhara, 1995:103). Another relevant factor 
in this context relates to certain core principles o f  the O AU, which member 
states pledged to ‘observe scrupulously’. They are:
•  the sovereign equality o f  all states;
•  non-interference in the internal affairs o f  states; and
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• respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and its 
inalienable right to independent existence.
These provisions mean that unless the government of the state in question 
decides to ask for international support for conciliation in inter-state or intra­
state conflicts, or the UN Security Council decides that intervention is required, 
there are no coercive instruments to address any incipient crises. In addition to 
ad hoc arrangements, these provisions have constantly posed particular 
difficulties in conflict management and resolution in African states wrecked by 
civil war or other forms of violent dissent (Steyn, 1997:9).
In 1991, the OAU committed itself to deploying greater efforts towards the 
creation of an enabling environment for conflict prevention, management and 
resolution (Organisation of African Unity, undated). The Kampala Document of 
23 May 1991 represented the first concerted African call for a continental 
peacekeeping body in Africa. Although not an official OAU document, it 
nevertheless carried considerable weight.
In the Kampala Document it was suggested that Africa should institute a 
continental peacekeeping machinery as an important instrument for the 
preservation of peace in instances which potentially or actually threaten the 
security of African state(s) or the continent as a whole. In order to realise the 
establishment of a continental peacekeeping body, each participating member 
state was called upon to implement special training measures in peace-support 
operations for a contingent o f its armed forces. In view of this, a continental 
peace-support operation was regarded as an ad hoc operation through rapid 
mobilisation of pre-agreed manpower and financial contributions from member 
states (Anon., 1991:iv-v).
Another important milestone was the establishment of the OAU’s Mechanism 
for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Cairo in 1993. This was 
a less ambitious initiative and should be seen as a departure from the OAU’s 
earlier ad hoc arrangements for conflict management. It confirmed African 
leaders’ determination to work together and assume greater responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent.
In establishing the Mechanism, the African heads of state and government were 
inter alia guided by the following principal considerations:
• The UN should clearly remain the pre-eminent international authority with 
the responsibility for dealing with international peace and security, including 
internal crises, which threaten regional stability in Africa.
• The UN, together with regional and sub-regional organisations should form a 
partnership in framing new approaches to crisis prevention, management and 
resolution in the post-Cold War era.
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•  Regional and sub-regional organisations on the one hand, and the UN system 
on the other, should endeavour to share proportionately the burden relating to 
the maintenance of worldwide peace, security and stability.
• As a regional organisation, the OAU should realise the need for it to take 
primary responsibility for its own problems, especially those relating to 
issues of peace, security and stability (Nhara, 1998:33-34).
It was declared that the primary objective of the Mechanism was the anticipation 
and prevention of conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it 
would be its responsibility to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding 
functions in order to facilitate the resolution of such conflicts (Organisation of 
African Unity, 1993). The OAU has, accordingly, spent a lot of energy in 
assuring that the Mechanism becomes fully operational (Nhara, 1995:104). Yet, 
it cannot be stated that the Mechanism has made a significant impact since it 
was created in 1993 (Berman & Sams, 1998:6).
As far as funding of support operations on the African continent is concerned, it 
must be noted that a special fund, known as the ‘OAU Peace Fund’, was created 
in the wake of the adoption of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution. The purpose of this fund is to provide exclusive 
support for OAU operational activities relating to conflict management. 
Contributions to this fund will be used for OAU activities undertaken within the 
framework of conflict anticipation and prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding 
and peacekeeping (Nhara, 1995:107).
In conclusion, it is stipulated in the UN Charter that regional problems should, 
ipso facto, have regional solutions. Hence, there is a pressing need for regional 
organisations, such as the OAU, to take care of their own security problems and 
the burden of conflict. In addition, it is today believed that sub-regional 
organisations should also endeavour to share the burden relating to the 
maintenance of worldwide peace and security proportionately.
4. Sub-regional peace initiatives
The OAU was entrusted with the responsibility of promoting the unity and 
solidarity of African states and ensuring the peaceful settlement of disputes by 
negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration, and has had this responsibility 
for peacekeeping since its inception in 1963. The first real peacekeeping test for 
the OAU was the Chadian imbroglio which was dealt with in 1981 by the OAU 
heads of state and since then, the OAU has dealt with many and varied forms of 
conflict (Olonisakin, 1997:351; Nhara, 1995:101-102). However, the OAU, as 
the UN at the top of the pyramid, is experiencing financial problems. From this 
account, a tenuous financial base hampers the OAU’s ability to make progress in 
promoting peace and security (Berman & Sams, 1998:6).
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In the light thereof, it would seem that a devolution of responsibility from the 
UN to regional or sub-regional organisations, such as the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), offers the benefit of alleviating capacity 
problems for the cash-strapped UN by assuming or sharing some of its peace- 
support responsibilities. The assumption is furthermore that because such 
organisations are more familiar with the local conditions, they have a 
comparative advantage to play a conflict-resolution role in volatile parts of the 
world (Vogt, 1998:8).
If regional organisations are primarily responsible for dealing with their own 
security problems, it does not imply that this step diverts from UN guidance and 
control. Regional organisations and arrangements on the one hand, and the UN 
system on the other, should endeavour to share the responsibility of maintaining 
peace. According to Nhara (1995:100) the UN and regional and sub-regional 
organisations should form and maintain partnerships and act decisively and 
expeditiously when framing new approaches to crisis prevention, management 
and resolution. However, the UN, with its cumulative experience, should remain 
the pre-eminent international authority responsible for dealing with international 
peace and security, as well as with internal crises that threaten regional stability, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. On this account, Arnold (1997:33) concludes 
that it relates to an approach that assigns peacekeeping responsibilities to 
regional or other organisations in accordance with current UN policy.
At sub-regional level the most prominent organisation in Africa involved in 
peace initiatives thus far is notably the one created for the Liberian conflict by 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Initially termed a 
“Monitoring Group”, this military organisation is generally known by its 
acronym, ECOMOG. It developed in August 1990 out o f the military forces 
deployed into Liberia in an attempt to put an end to the civil war. Over the 
period of its existence, it has included contingents from eight West African and 
two East African States.
ECOMOG has since its exception been controlled largely by Nigeria. Critics of 
the organisation have often complained that the organisation was a thin veil for 
Nigerian hegemonic ambitions. This generally accompanied accusations that 
Nigerians controlled all the key staff positions and unfairly diverted resources to 
their fellow countrymen. It also included allegations of Nigeria’s lack of 
neutrality, which has led to a severe degradation of ECOMOG’s credibility as a 
role-player in the Liberian conflict (Henk, 1995:13). In 1997 ECOMOG made 
international headlines when it intervened in Sierra Leone to reverse a military 
coup and restore power to elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Again 
Nigerian domination was prominent as hundreds of Nigerian troops were sent in 
with a view to driving out the military regime (Anon., 1998c:7).
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Another significant example of developing responses to African crises in West 
Africa relates to the two-year-old conflict in the Central African Republic in the 
form of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bungui Accords (MISAB). 
Provided with a UN mandate, MISAB formally became the buffer between the 
combatants on 12 February 1997. Comprising just over 1 000 soldiers from six 
African countries, the force was commanded by a Senegalese officer and 
supported by French logistics. Although small in size and posture, and perhaps 
insignificant in world politics, MISAB has reduced the tensions and security 
problems in the Central African Republic in its attempt at indigenous 
multinational peacekeeping. MISAB has proved that there is a political will 
towards contributing to peaceful conflict resolution in certain parts of Africa 
(McFarlane & Malan, 1998:48, 53, 57).
A further meaningful development in West Africa relates to a military exercise 
held in Senegal in March 1998 which featured a mock operation to protect 
civilians in war zones, fly them to safety and organise refugee camps. Senegal, 
Mauritania and Mali organised and commanded the exercise in which soldiers 
from Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ghana, Gambia and Cape Verde took part. France 
supplied the equipment and was responsible for the logistics while the US and 
Britain sent troops. The exercise also enjoyed the support o f the Secretary- 
General of the UN and can clearly be regarded as part of capacity-building 
efforts to establish a regional or sub-regional response capability of some kind 
(Gibson, 1998:11).
In Southern Africa the initiatives of SADC represent an important step in the 
development of regional solutions to regional problems. As far as peace-support 
operations are concerned, SADC’s Organ for Politics, Defence and Security at 
political level and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) at 
technical level will seemingly provide the possible future framework for co­
operation and assistance for such operations, as well as co-operative security in 
Southern Africa.
The objectives of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security place a 
heavy emphasis on the development of political and diplomatic skills to deal 
with the prevention and resolution of intra- and extra-regional conflict; a 
commitment to a common regional (Southern African) approach to all issues and 
problems of mutual concern; and undertakings to foster democratic institutions 
and practices within member states. Of particular concern is the objective to 
develop a collective security capacity; to conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for 
responding to external threats; and to develop a peacekeeping capacity within 
national armies that could be called upon within Southern Africa or elsewhere 
on the continent (Van Aardt, 1997:7-18).
An approach to what appears to be a possible (and perhaps ideal) future model 
for peace-support operations in Southern Africa is the following: Firstly, that
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such operations will be undertaken by SADC as a sub-regional organisation. 
Secondly, that such efforts be politically and morally fully sanctioned and 
supported by the OAU, while the UN will provide the necessary international 
support and endorsement.
However, the progress made in 1996 with the establishment of the SADC Organ 
on Politics, Defence and Security has come under pressure as problems are 
being experienced in respect o f the actual realisation of objectives and the 
structuring of the various institutions of the Organ. There is still a need for 
proper structural arrangements and divergent positions on its operational 
procedures (Tsie, 1998:8). The main problem evidently relates to differences 
between the heads of state -  especially between South Africa and Zimbabwe -  
over the political control and status of the Organ. Some SADC countries, 
including South Africa, believe the body should fall under the SADC 
chairperson, while others, including Zimbabwe, maintain that it should be an 
autonomous body (Fabricius, 1998a:6). Much will therefore depend on efforts to 
resolve this problem and the measure of future political cohesion in SADC.
On the positive side it should be mentioned that the 1SDSC successfully 
managed to initiate discussions on security co-operation since 1995. As a result, 
the armed forces of the majority of Southern African countries (including a 
contingent of the South African National Defence Force) participated in 
Exercise Blue Hungwe (Fish Eagle), a multinational peace-support exercise held 
early in 1997 in Zimbabwe, assisted and facilitated by British military experts. 
Exercise Blue Hungwe was followed by Exercise Blue Crane held in April 1999 
in South Africa at the grounds of the SA Army Battle School in the Northern 
Cape Province (Southern African Development Community, 1999:5-6) and was 
clearly the biggest peacekeeping exercise of its kind ever conducted on African 
soil. With these exercises the subregion came closer to sharing peace-support 
responsibilities on the African continent.
5. Externally inspired capacity-building efforts
As a result o f the need to intervene in internal crises, the United States (US) and 
some European nations, especially France and Britain, have started to support 
the idea of an African response capability of some kind, staffed and commanded 
almost exclusively by Africans. In this context, the African Crisis Response 
Force and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) have successively been 
tabled as the American answers to Africa’s peacekeeping challenges. The former 
was introduced in 1996 and related to the institution of a standing African force 
tasked with a peacekeeping responsibility, but was not met with a great deal of 
enthusiasm within Africa and elsewhere (Williams, 1997:1). The latter was a 
reaction to the lukewarm African response and can be regarded as a long-term 
plan; a first step in a programme to encourage and assist African countries in
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training and capacity building to develop or establish a response capability of 
some kind (Whitelaw, 1997:36).
While the ACRI is mainly aimed at capacity building through training, it is 
hoped that the initiative will eventually be instrumental in promoting peace on 
the African continent. As far as deployment is concerned, the political authority 
would come from the UN Security Council and not from the ACRI itself. 
Accordingly, once trained, it is envisaged that participating units would be 
deployed, when called upon to do so, as part of
• a UN operation, under the political direction of the UN;
• a multinational force with Security Council approval, but where a group of 
countries have come together on a voluntary basis to provide the peace­
keepers (perhaps with an African country assuming the leading role);
• a force constituted by member states and directed by a sub-regional organisa­
tion; and
• an operation undertaken by the OAU (Malan, 1997:1).
Even if the ACRI has come a long way since it was proposed as the ACRF, a 
host of issues have been brought up in criticism against the US initiative. Firstly, 
there is a perception that an approach to develop an indigenous African capacity 
to deal with conflicts on the continent represents a trend towards a ‘do-it- 
yourself project’ of peacekeeping in Africa; of removing African problems from 
the UN agenda. It is thus an issue of Western nations trying to give themselves 
an excuse not to become involved in African conflicts (Whitelaw, 1997:35).
A further bone of contention relates to the fact that the ACRI is perceived in 
some circles to be a unilaterally US driven initiative, despite assurances to the 
contrary (Malan, 1997:4). On the positive side the idea of an all-African Military 
Peace Force trades on the growing sentiment among many African armed forces 
(particularly those with peacekeeping experience) that they are not afforded the 
necessary seniority and responsibility in the conduct of peace missions -  
particularly on African soil (Williams, 1997:1). At the same time the ACRI is 
based on the premise that if the international community has a capacity or group 
of military units in Africa from which it could draw a peacekeeping force, it 
would be better prepared to respond to conflicts and crises in Africa (Jamerson, 
1998:43). There is, furthermore, little doubt that the ACRI is a result of the all 
but outstanding performance of the UN system in the field of African 
peacekeeping and that UN peacekeeping is clearly in a poor state in terms of 
finances, doctrine, troop contributions and co-ordination. A number of missions, 
especially Rwanda and Somalia, have served to underscore the problems of the 
UN in this regard (Malan, 1997:5).
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However, the US is still faced with several challenges. The first is to persuade 
African governments to sign up. Only a limited number of African states have 
accepted the American concept of military training and capacity building, 
namely Uganda, Senegal, Malawi, Ghana and Mali (Berman & Sams, 1998:15). 
Some of Africa’s armies are still on the sideline, watching others to oversee the 
peacekeeping requirements. The lack of a clear concept for capacity utilisation 
under UN and OAU auspices might also have caused reservations against 
signing up. Nigeria, unquestionably the giant in West Africa, could not 
participate until recently because of US sanctions against the country’s political 
leadership1. South Africa, the political leader in Southern Africa and perhaps the 
strongest military force on the continent, has not explicitly committed itself to 
participation in the ACRI (Whitelaw, 1997:36), although it has come to support 
the principle of strengthening Africa’s capability at peacekeeping.
By design, the ACRI is now regarded as a long-term plan; a first step in a long­
term programme to encourage and assist in the transformation of the African 
security environment where most violence that does occur can be handled 
without massive outside involvement or unrealistic demands on American 
resources (Henk & Metz, 1997:ix, xi). By the same token, there is already a 
good foundation in Africa to build on as regards future peacekeeping 
requirements. The OAU has gained experience in monitoring problem areas. A 
number of African states have been participating in peace-support operations 
under UN mandates. Many African states have troops prepared to participate in 
peacekeeping operations, but not the resources to finance them. In addition, 
several members of the international community are willing to support peace 
missions in Africa, but believe that African nations should take the leading role 
(Institute for Public Policy, 1998).
Some observers correctly point out that the OAU, unlike the UN, was not 
created for the purpose of maintaining peace and security and that most regional 
organisations currently lack the capacity to direct and control a peace mission 
(Malan, 1997:6). On that score, what the US envisages is to provide capabilities 
and resources to support the existing capacity that Africans have demonstrated 
in the area of peacekeeping and to create a capacity to respond more quickly to 
crisis situations on the continent, whether it be involvement in conflict 
situations, humanitarian assistance, or response to natural disasters (Institute for 
Public Policy, 1998). Moreover, the concept o f the ACR] seems to fit into a 
stronger role for sub-regional organisations, as it provides for forces constituted 
by African states and directed by a sub-regional organisation with Security 
Council approval (Shelton, 1987:82). Quite appropriately, the US has now come 
to recognise the growing role of sub-regional organisations and their initiatives
1 The US lifted sanctions against Nigeria after the country 's return to democracy in May 1999.
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to promote the development of a peacekeeping capacity to respond to emergency 
situations in Africa (Jamerson, 1998:44).
In general, what seems to be lacking thus far is the aspect of meaningful co­
operation. Without such co-operation, it will be impossible to establish a clear 
direction and guidelines as to the nature and scope of interventions for which 
African personnel and capabilities will most likely be required and under whose 
direction deployment will take place. What is likewise needed, is what may be 
described as the ‘command and control’-element, or clarity on the higher 
headquarters that can direct and sustain efforts to bring Africans from several 
different nations together to train and achieve a common purpose on the 
continent (Jamerson, 1998:46). It can furthermore be stated that, for the US to 
succeed in shaping the African security environment, it will have to develop a 
pattern of regional engagement based on consultation, consensus and co­
operation. Only in this way will they provide some benefits to Africans and be 
able to support US ideals and interests in Africa.
In the light of previous debates on the issue and as a result of the above­
mentioned initiatives, the OAU Council of Ministers has decided in February 
1998 to accept the principle of an African peace force of some kind that will 
carry out peace-support operations under UN and OAU auspices. They have also 
acknowledged the efforts and initiatives of the US, France and Britain to 
improve the ability of African forces to conduct peace-support operations in 
Africa (Anon., 1998b:9). However, many questions remain unclear, especially 
as regards the following:
• What will the generic objectives governing African involvement in peace- 
support operations be?
• In what kind of peace-support operations will such a force be prepared to 
engage?
• How will the financial arrangements for peace-support operations be 
determined?
• How will African entry and exit criteria be determined and who should be the 
key role-players in setting the necessary parameters?
• What should be done in the fields of interoperability o f equipment; 
formulation of common doctrines; allocation of responsibilities to different 
participating states; command responsibilities within combined forces, and 
many more? (Williams, 1997:3).
Over and above these questions, an integrated African and sub-regional policy 
on peace-support operations seems to be imperative. At the same time, it should 
be borne in mind that peace-support operations are international endeavours, 
endorsed by the UN, and conducted in accordance with the internationalist ethos
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of the UN Charter (Williams, 1997:2-3). Against this background Vogt (1998: 
12) argues that the ideal arrangement will be one in which the OAU is fully 
involved in all aspects of the preparations of African forces for UN operations 
on the continent. The OAU should, furthermore, be in a position to deploy peace 
missions into African conflicts, based on a UN mandate and with sufficient 
political and financial backing from the international community.
6. Continued UN involvement in African peacekeeping
African countries have begun to make economic and political progress in recent 
years, but in some parts of the continent progress remains threatened or impeded 
by conflict. The question is: Where is African peacekeeping heading in the 
future? If the report o f Kofi Annan, Secretary-General o f the UN, on The Causes 
o f Conflict and the Promotion o f  Durable Peace and Sustainable Development 
in Africa is to be taken as a pointer towards the future of UN involvement in 
African peacekeeping requirements, it would seem that the organisation is eager 
to add momentum to Africa’s renewed quest for peace and greater prosperity. 
Three aspects are of special relevance:
•  The Secretary-General holds the view that under the right conditions, UN 
peace-support operations can make the difference between peace and war in 
Africa. However, his view includes the realisation that UN peacekeeping will 
not always be the best answer to every problem in Africa or elsewhere. Yet, 
where opportunities in Africa arise, the international community should 
provide its support, demonstrating its commitment to peace in a tangible way.
• Most important is the Secretary-General’s view that the provision of support 
for regional and sub-regional initiatives is regarded as both necessary and 
desirable. It is necessary because the UN lacks the capacity, resources and 
expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa. It is also desirable 
because, wherever possible, the international community should strive to 
complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa’s 
problems. By the same token, reinforcing the capacity of African countries to 
operate in peace-support operations is a key priority, whether those 
operations take place in the framework of a UN mission or are conducted by 
a regional organisation or group of states in accordance with Security 
Council authority. The Secretary-General recognises that, in recent years, 
there have been a number of new African initiatives to resolve disputes that 
have long plagued particular areas or to tackle new conflicts before they can 
expand and escalate beyond control. The activities of ECOMOG in Liberia 
are especially regarded as an example of co-operation between the UN and a 
sub-regional organisation that might be applicable to future situations.
• The view is also held that wide disparities in the international community’s 
commitment to preventing or containing conflicts in different regions impede
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the ability of the UN to promote a stable and just international order 
anywhere. Member states must therefore be engaged in terms of political will 
and practical resources if the viability of the UN and the principle for which 
it stands are to be safeguarded, let alone advanced (Annan, 1998b).
In addition, summoning the necessary political will is at stake. According to 
Annan, this relates to two aspects:
• Firstly, that Africa must demonstrate the will to rely upon political rather 
than military responses to problems. African countries must likewise 
summon the will to take good governance seriously, ensuring human rights 
and the rule of law, strengthening democratisation and promoting 
transparency in public administration.
• Secondly, political will is also needed from the international community. 
Where the international community is committed to making a difference, it 
has proved that significant and rapid transformation can be achieved (Annan, 
1998b).
Against this background, it is realised on the part of the UN that the credibility 
of the world body in Africa depends to a great extent upon the international 
community’s willingness to act and to explore new means of advancing the 
objectives of peace and security on the continent (Annan, 1998b). Therefore, 
since the current Secretary-General of the UN assumed office in 1996, the OAU 
and African governments have been engaged in discussions on the ways and 
means by which the UN and the OAU can collaborate better to prevent, manage 
and resolve conflicts in the African environment more effectively (Vogt, 
1998:11).
What is also significant in view of the above is the fact that the UN now seems 
prepared to form partnerships with willing regional organisations and alliances 
in Africa. In the case of the Liberian peacekeeping effort (which is especially 
regarded as an example of co-operation between the UN and a sub-regional 
organisation) the more robust ‘peacekeeping’ was done by ECOMOG, while the 
UN mission was deployed to observe the ‘peacekeepers’ as well as the 
belligerents (Malan, 1998a:4). What is of concern are ways and means through 
which the UN can operate in closer co-operation with African stakeholders.
7. Non-UN intervention operations
The past decade has recorded a growth in intervention operations internationally, 
under the guise of peacekeeping or peace enforcement, usually under the 
auspices of the UN. At the same time, it would seem that the UN is a 
cumbersome participant in the attempted settlement of Africa’s fluid and 
complex conflicts. It is hampered by peculiar decision-making mechanisms and
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chronically short o f cash as recalcitrant members states refuse to pay their dues. 
In addition, it has to look constantly over its shoulder to the demands of the 
major powers and is characteristically under pressure to look for cheap and 
quick fix solutions to conflicts (Clapman, 1998:3). It has also become apparent 
that the UN can only be mobilised effectively to intervene in a crisis when the 
interests of the major powers, especially the Security Council members are 
effected. To this end, the intervention of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone and SADC 
member state’s military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) and in Lesotho without UN endorsement and involvement is o f particular 
interest.
On 25 May 1997, the rule of President Ahmed Kabbah was overthrown by 
Major Johnny Paul Koroma; the third change of government by force in five 
years in Sierra Leone. The coup was the most bloody and destructive in Sierra 
Leone’s history as nationalist appeals helped win over the Sierra Leone Army. 
The justifications of the coup were very self-serving, as Koroma’s first public 
statement on 28 May made mention of intervention because the country had 
“polarised into regional and tribal factions” and the peace agreement in the 
country had collapsed. The coup derailed a brief democratic exercise: Kabbah’s 
multi-party civilian government lasted just more than a year after elections in 
February 1996.
The OAU, Commonwealth, ECOWAS and Western governments condemned 
the coup. Ghana’s President, Jerry Rawlings, and Nigerian Foreign Minister, 
Tom Ikimi, initially tried to negotiate with the rebels by telephone. But ousted 
President Kabbah requested Nigeria to intervene whereafter the Nigerian forces 
rushed to Freetown in an attempt to unseat the new military regime. The OAU 
and Commonwealth then implicitly blessed the intervention, but the fact remains 
that Nigeria went to Sierra Leone under the banner o f ECOMOG without any 
official mandate (Anon., 1997:7). The intervention was a direct result of a 
defence agreement between Nigeria and the government of Sierra Leone which 
provided for military and security assistance for sustenance of the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity o f the latter (Hough, 1998:35).
The political crisis in Sierra Leone eventually erupted into a full-scale war, with 
West African forces backed by warplanes and heavy artillery battling to evict 
the country’s new unrecognised military rulers. In February 1998, Nigerian 
troops managed to record a measure of success in their efforts to oust Sierra 
Leone’s military junta from the capital, Freetown. However, the largely Nigerian 
intervention force came under increasing criticism, especially since Nigeria 
itself was ruled by a military junta (Sapa-AFP & Reuters, 1998:4). By 15 
February 1998, virtually all Freetown had been taken by a pincer movement of 
the wholly Nigerian force (Anon., 1998b:7) and ECOMOG was commended by 
the Secretary General of the OAU for its initiative (Gibson, 1998:9). At the same 
time, many people got killed and thousands fled as shells hit residential areas,
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despite repeated pleas to combatants not to fire blindly, or target civilians or to 
use them for any military purpose (Sapa-AFP & Reuters, 1998:4). Yet, peace 
has not been restored in this conflict-ridden country.
In August 1998, SADC became the focus of international attention when 
Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia decided to take part in an intervention 
operation in the DRC. The decision was based on requests from President 
Laurent Kabila for military assistance (DRC became a member of SADC in 
1997) against advancing rebel forces. South Africa specifically stressed the need 
for a peaceful solution and declined to send troops. It was also reported that 
South Africa would only consider sending troops should a peacekeeping force 
(presumably in accordance with a UN mandate) be deployed in the DRC. This 
resulted in criticism from Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, as the leading 
figure in the mission to prop up the regime of Kabila, who got to power through 
military force -  but who was referred to as “legitimate” by President Sam 
Nujoma from Namibia.
The South African decision eventually proved to be a wise one as Rwanda and 
Uganda decided to engage in the conflict in support o f the rebel movement, 
while Chad and Sudan were subsequently drawn in to fight on the side of Kabila 
(Lótter, 1998:9). Another important point relates to the fact that Zimbabwe and 
Angola got criticised as reporters claimed that Zimbabwe’s main motive was an 
effort to push Zimbabwean business into the Congo. Similarly, it was reported 
that Angola’s interest was to prevent the Angolan rebel force, Unita, from using 
the DRC as a rear-base (Fabricius, 1998b:8).
In September 1998, shortly after Kabila’s request for assistance, South Africa 
and Botswana intervened in Lesotho in an attempt to stop a possible coup from 
the Lesotho armed forces. The decision was based and justified by referring to 
the fact that SADC was directly approached for intervention by the Prime 
Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, that the intervention was based on 
agreements reached in SADC; and that all attempts at peaceful resolving the 
dispute had failed. It was furthermore stated that the Lesotho government was 
democratically elected (despite certain irregularities during the election process) 
and that it was increasingly required of South Africa to play a role in regional 
peacekeeping efforts (Hough, 1998:38). In addition, it was stated that the 
decision gave notice to ambitious elements in the military forces in the region 
that in no member state would the political aspirations of any military faction be 
tolerated, and that South Africa’s commitment to this policy was a commitment 
to development in the region (Haysom, 1998:6).
Several questions were raised in the light of the above-mentioned. For example, 
as far as legitimacy is concerned, Hough (1998:37) rightfully poses the question 
whether ex-President Mobutu Sese Seko’s position in the former Zaire would 
have been different had the country been a member of SADC at the time of the
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rebellion in 1997 when he was toppled by Kabila. Some relevant questions are 
accordingly:
• When is a leader legitimate, or is legitimacy something in the eye of the 
beholder?
• Should there be UN Security Council permission for intervention in such 
cases?
• What about future responses to internal conflicts in terms of SADC 
objectives?
Suffice it to say that these questions mainly dealt with the modus operandi o f the 
intervention, and not the principle. However, these would seem to be important 
issues and they need to be addressed at multinational level.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the costs o f the above-mentioned 
“SADC operations” in the DRC and Lesotho had to be borne by the relevant 
countries themselves. In fact, it proved to be relatively huge and drained the 
resources of the respective countries. In the case of the Zimbabwean and 
Angolan participation in the DRC it was reported that these countries have 
indicated that they were not able to sustain their involvement for a long period 
(Mdhlela, 1998:1). In Zimbabwe, for example, a tone bordering on panic started 
to pervade Zimbabwe’s business community a few weeks after the intervention, 
where each day was greeted with outrage at the plummeting local dollar (Anon., 
1998a:4). The intervention operation in Lesotho has similarly been the cause of 
a serious discourse in certain circles as regards the ability and capabilities of 
Southern African forces to engage in peacekeeping incursions. Overall, the 
question is whether regional or sub-regional institutions in Africa are ready and 
geared to engage in peacekeeping efforts on their own and even whether they 
should opt for such a route in future.
8. Whither Non-UN intervention operations
Bir (1997:22) states that the internal affairs of many countries have become an 
important component of the new world order, making intervention a legitimate 
right. It can even be regarded as an obligation upon the international community 
whenever a risk or threat to international peace arises. This implies that the 
broad community of nations has the legitimate right and responsibility to 
intervene when conditions require people to preserve peace.
The question is: Given the sustained importance of the principles of sovereignty 
and non-interference in internal affairs, when should a situation in an African 
state be considered to have deteriorated to such an extent that the security of 
people has been violated to the point that it requires international and/or regional 
response on humanitarian grounds?
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Until recently, intervention operations have been conducted under the auspices 
of the UN and under the guise of peacekeeping and especially peace enforce­
ment. The UN operations in Somalia is a typical example in this regard as it was 
basically a peace-making operation based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
(Bir, 1997:24). However, it has been indicated in the preceding that recent 
developments in Africa (Sierra Leone, the DRC and Lesotho) have all pointed 
towards intervention operations without UN endorsement.
In this context, it should be noted that the formulation of UN mandates is 
generally a time-consuming process that does not in principle provide for swift 
intervention in internal crises. For example, in the conflicts in Angola and 
Rwanda, the UN forces were brought in at a fairly late stage of the proceedings 
(Clapman, 1998:9). Moreover, Vogt (1998:7) states that in recent experiences, 
the OAU has found that even when Africans are prepared to provide the forces 
for deployment in UN operations in Africa, the Security Council has been 
reluctant to authorise such missions. One explanation is that some of the 
Security Council members do not want to commit resources to African 
operations that may continue for indefinite periods. This was the case in Congo 
Brazzaville, Sierra Leone and the Comoros. In addition, Bir (1997:25) argues 
that the current UN structure is not suitable for the proper conducting of 
intervention operations.
It is furthermore interesting to note that it has been suggested that the inter­
vention operation in the DRC be followed by an international peace-support 
operation under the auspices of the OAU and the UN. This was jointly proposed 
by the heads of state from Kenya, Tanzania and Namibia in October 1997 -  two 
months after Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola had decided to intervene in the 
DRC. Practically speaking, this implied the orderly disengagement of all troops 
to allow for neutral peacekeepers as part of a multinational peace-support 
operation to pave the way for political negotiations (Anon., 1998d:4). Un­
fortunately, no peace plan has yet been accepted by the belligerents.
What seems to be important is to address potential conflicts or coups before they 
can take place or can escalate beyond control. This was strikingly articulated by 
the officer commanding the intervention operation in Lesotho, Col Robbie 
Hartslief, who suggested that “ ... this kind of intervention (in Lesotho) be 
accepted as a new kind of peace-support operation in Africa, because such 
operations may prevent a massive loss of lives and enormous economic 
damage”. According to Hartslief, everything possible must be done to prevent 
civil war and this can be achieved only if intervention takes place before an 
armed conflict can occur. “The problem is that people romanticise peace-support 
operations. It would seem to me that firstly they want to have an outbreak of 
civil war, then a cease-fire, then an agreement which is acknowledged by the 
UN and only then should the peace force move in” (Stofberg, 1998:9).
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The principle behind the preceding viewpoint cannot be disputed. The Secretary- 
General of the UN, Kofi Annan, has stated himself that peacekeeping (in the 
broadest sense) can help prevent conflict from breaking out in the first place 
(Annan, 1998a:3). At the same time, the Secretary-General is also strongly 
committed to the principle that Africa must rely upon political rather than 
military responses to problems (Annan, 1998b:29-30) and that conflicts in 
Africa can only be solved in the framework of compromises, tolerance and 
peaceful resolution of such conflicts (Valentine, 1998:4).
In the final analysis, it should be bome in mind that peacekeeping is in essence a 
responsibility of the UN, that it should be endorsed by the world body, and 
conducted in accordance with the internationalist ethos of the UN Charter. This 
would imply that any justification for military intervention on the grounds that it 
is in the interest of peace must proceed from the assumption that it is not 
contradictory to the UN Charter. To this end, Bir (1997:25) suggests that 
intervention operations should be led by regional organisations or military 
organisations, such as NATO, or even a single nation under the political 
authorisation of the UN. However, this would imply that the formulation of UN 
mandates should not inhibit swift intervention in internal crises and that regional 
or sub-regional organisations should clearly provide for guidelines as regards 
military responses to internal conflicts in the framework of sound objectives. 
Besides, no organisation may ever prop up any questionable government and the 
legitimacy of a particular leader may never be something in the eye of the 
beholder. In addition, no military intervention should ever go beyond the ambit 
of international law as the international community or regional groupings are 
obviously not in a position to engage or interfere in any country’s domestic 
affairs in unqualified terms.
9. Conclusion
There can be no doubt that the UN is still the principal organ that is vested with 
the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. But it 
might also be stated that the UN is a cumbersome participant in the settlement of 
Africa’s fluid and complex conflicts. Moreover, the number of internal wars in 
this part of the world has challenged all the tools o f international conflict 
management. What is clear from the above is that the international system is 
unable (or even unwilling in some instances) to provide proper mechanisms for 
the management or resolution of African conflicts.
In this context, the deterioration of the security situation in Africa has led to a 
reconsideration of the debate and of the present framework to account for the 
need for ways and means through which the UN can operate in closer co­
operation with continental stakeholders in respect o f peace-support operations. 
What is significant is the fact that the UN now seems prepared to form 
partnerships with willing regional organisations and alliances in Africa as far as
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conducting peace-support operations are concerned. This relates to the idea of 
shared responsibility between the UN and continental stakeholders for the 
effective management of conflicts in Africa. As such, Africa is the first 
continent where extensive efforts have been made recently between the UN and 
the OAU with the specific objective of enhancing the management of conflicts 
in the region. However, many issues remain unclear as regards an ideal 
arrangement between the UN, the OAU and other role-players, such as the US.
It has also been pointed out that since last year and in parallel with the above­
mentioned developments, sub-regional organisations in Africa have become 
directly involved in intervention operations in attempts to intervene before and 
after the outbreak of civil wars. However, what is o f special interest is the fact 
that the operations in Siena Leone, the DRC and Lesotho have been conducted 
without the direct support and authority of the UN. It is also striking that the 
motives of the different states have not always been consistent and actions have 
not been undertaken in a circumscribed framework. Consequently, the motives 
of the interventionists have been called into question while many questions in 
respect of the modus operandi of these operations have also been raised.
In view of the preceding, it would go a long way if the relevant groupings in 
Africa could develop a set of broad principles for responsibilities to preserve 
regional security. It is advisable that they should especially work out clear 
means to respond appropriately and speedily to threats to peace in co-operation 
with the UN and other stakeholders. It is imperative to develop such principles 
so as to avoid a haphazard, reactive response and decisions implemented 
hurriedly in reaction to unforeseen crises -  especially as African countries and 
organisations are in the process of accepting an increasing burden of 
responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent. It is 
likewise of major interest that African governments should not send a message 
to the world that Africans prefer different methods for dealing collectively with 
conflict than those accepted by the UN. Hence, it would seem that the legal basis 
for delegating responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security in the 
African context needs to be clarified.
Multilateral intervention will always be done on a case-by-case basis, but the 
judgement itself must be exercised within a circumscribed framework to which 
all parties have agreed. It also seems to be imperative to cultivate a regional 
environment in which the use of force remains the last possible means of 
resolving disputes, especially when action is undertaken on the basis of 
humanitarian considerations. From a moral and practical viewpoint, an approach 
that elevates persuasion, conciliation, arbitration and non-violent coercion above 
the use of force should be favoured. In the final instance, the challenge is to 
establish an acceptable basis for involvement or intervention in intra-state 
conflicts that respects the dignity and independence of states without sanctioning
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the misuse of sovereign rights to violate the security of people within a state’s 
borders.
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